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Abstract 
 
Navigation in the littoral waters of Norway is based on long traditions. All naval units 
spend much time and effort to navigate faster, safer and tactically clever. For decades 
radar has been the most important tool to ensure navigation at an acceptable risk level. 
After the introduction of computer based integrated bridge systems, it was possible to 
give the navigators a new set of tools, and it was technologically possible to do things 
faster and with a higher level of automation and precision. However, the introduction of 
new technology did not only lead to a safer and more efficient navigation. The statistics 
revealed that during the last decade, collisions still happened at approximately the same 
frequency. Most of the collisions reports express that violations of “the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea” (COLREG) occur. The reports also 
describe incorrect use of radar and AIS and lack of understanding of the systems. 
In addition to visual evaluation, radar and AIS are the most important aids to avoid a 
collision. The radar is well known, but has been constantly developed. Even if AIS is 
relatively new, most ships have installed it, but it is not always taken maximum 
advantage of. 
In order to investigate how radar and AIS are utilised in the Norwegian navy, the 
fieldwork consisted of observation of live navigation on board the Skjold class and in 
the simulator at NNC. In addition 19 officers were interviewed by means of a 
questionnaire to evaluate the level of knowledge within radar and AIS. 
The findings indicate that all the different aids provided in an IBS to avoid collisions are 
not fully understood and not fully utilised. Some automatic functions are never used and 
hardly ever explored. Visual observations were the most important and most used input 
factors to create a SA before decisions were made. The electronic information provided 
by radar and AIS was not always utilised to achieve an optimal SA.  
However, all potential collisions incidents in the field tests were handled in a 
professional and safe way. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Professional navigation is in general a skill that requires a combination of long 
education, much training, and a lot of experience. Even if that is a fact, there is a 
constant dynamic that challenges the navigators when making crucial decisions based 
on their current situation awareness and best judgement. The solution is not always 
straight forward; there are always several solutions to a situation that all might solve the 
situation. Navigating within the skerries and cruel littoral waters of the long Norwegian 
coastline does not make the situation easier, and combined with bad weather in different 
seasons, there is a potential risk of accidents.  
During the last decade, the evolution within the maritime domain has been substantial, 
being very well described by Lee and Sanquist who already 13 years ago saw the trends.  
“Naval maritime navigation is in a state of transition which could affect the 
safety and performance of ships and their crews. Paper charts are replaced by 
electronic charts, crew sizes are reduced, and ship speeds are increasing”(Lee 
and Sanquist, 2000). 
The quotation is generally recognised as still valid for the Norwegian Navy and 
probably also for other navies and civilian maritime shipping. 
In worst case, a collision may cost human lives, but can also cause pollution, and be 
costly for the ship owners. In 1977 the International Rules for the Prevention of 
Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG) (IMO, 1972), came into force, and combined with 
requirements under IMO’s  Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping 
Code (STCW) (IMO, 1978), and some parts of the International Safety Management 
Code (ISM) (IMO, 2010), collisions could theoretically be avoided. This is also 
confirmed in the safety study carried out by Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
which declares that collisions could hypothetically be avoided if every vessel abided by 
the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions (MAIB, 2004).  
However, it is still a fact that collisions happen on a regular basis. Despite constant 
development of better radars with more sophisticated technology and the introduction of 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) specialised in aiding navigators to achieve good 
situation awareness, there is still a number of accidents in Norway and in other parts of 
the world. The introduction of Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) and the transformation 
from paper chart to integrated electronic chart systems should facilitate even better 
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decisions in challenging situations, but that might not always be the case (NNC, 2007, 
Norris, 2008).  
The Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) which has jurisdiction of ships registered 
in Norway and foreign ships arriving Norwegian ports, reported 24 collisions in 2010 
which is an increase compared to 2009 and 2008. 
In 2004 the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in the United Kingdom also 
issued a study of collisions, groundings, contacts and near collisions that took place in 
the timeframe 1994 – 2003. This study revealed that the COLREG were contravened in 
most collisions and that the most common contributory factors in all the collisions were 
poor lookout and poor use of radar (MAIB, 2004). 
1.2 Research Focus 
Unfortunately, the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) also has considerable experience 
with groundings, collisions, and other navigation accidents. In 2006 a large study was 
carried out, singling out the different factors causing the accidents in the RNoN over a 
long period (Gould et al., 2006). Since 1989, the estimated incidence of major 
navigation mishaps (not only collisions) in the RNoN has been around six vessels per 
year (MOD, 2005). As in the civilian domain, groundings are dominant, but there have 
been several collisions also in the RNoN. The exact statistics for the RNoN are not 
available due to military regulations.  
After 2005 the numbers of operational ships in the RNoN has decreased and several 
new projects have been in progress, resulting in less operational time on patrol and a 
subsequent reduction in the groundings and collisions. Nevertheless, the challenges are 
still present. The RNoN is going through a modernisation period, and in time, all ships 
will have state of the art Integrated Bridge systems (IBS), which are based on type 
approved equipment for the civilian shipping market. Hence, it is reasonable to assume 
that the Norwegian navy will experience much of the same effects as any civilian ship. 
The focus will therefore be to investigate and analyse how radar and AIS are being 
utilised in the Norwegian Navy as anti-collision aids. The thesis will also concentrate on 
the knowledge that is relevant to and basis for the understanding and operation of radar 
and AIS. The results will be seen in context with the recent and future development in 
the navy, focusing on modern IBS fitted ships. 
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1.2.1 The purpose of the project and possible results 
The purpose of this research is to register navigators’ performance on modern IBS in 
the Norwegian navy when making use of the available means to avoid collision.   
The research will present an overview of the knowledge within the area of radar and 
AIS and the thesis will show whether it is necessary to adjust the level of radar and AIS 
training and operation. The result might also discover challenges within the IBS on a 
broader spectre. Furthermore, it might also suggest what kinds of changes are necessary 
to increase the navigation safety in the Norwegian Navy. 
1.3 Overall research aim and individual research objectives 
1.3.1 The thesis 
How are radar and AIS utilised in anti-collision on modern Integrated Bridge Systems 
(IBS) in the RNoN, within Norwegian littoral waters? 
1.3.2 Research aim 
The research aim is to identify areas within use of AIS and radar that can enhance safe 
navigation and hence reduce the probability for a collision to a minimum. 
1.3.3 Research objective 
The research aims to investigate to what extent radar and AIS are utilised in anti-
collision. The overall purpose of this research is to understand the role of radar and AIS 
in anti collision on board modern naval ships equipped with IBS and to investigate into 
the knowledge of the operators to find if they are adequately educated and trained for 
the task.  
1. Identify and examine the use of AIS and radar in anti-collision by live 
observations and simulated tests. 
2. Explore relevant anti-collision radar and AIS knowledge. 
3. Formulate recommendations for radar and AIS education and training. 
1.4 Research value 
A substantial evolvement within navigation has been going on for many years, and 
several ship owners and institutions have experienced this new technology entering the 
shipping world. There has been a clear need to investigate and discuss the effect of this 
new technology; one event in London even called the conference ECDIS Revolution. 
(ECDIS-Revolution, 2013) 
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The publication SNP-500 (NNC, 2012) issued by the Norwegian Navy Navigational 
Centre (NNC)  clearly stats that a technological revolution has occurred and the 
guidelines in the publication are made to make it easier for the users to understand the 
changes and how to use the equipment.  
A presentation from the NNC (2009) sums up the new challenges by this “bumper 
sticker:”  
“We have evolved from 6 knots with the Vikings  
to 60 knots with Bill Gates”.  
From this statement one can start to realise the challenges piling up.  
The RNoN decided early on to follow the modernisations process, equipping all the 
naval ships with modern navigational equipment in modern IBS. This transformation 
also leads to the need to review the well known and traditional procedures developed 
over decades. 
This research will look into one area that has been affected by this new modernisation. 
It is therefore important that the research is done in time before possible, inadequate 
new procedures are randomly emerging. The thesis will shape the basis for the change 
in how the Navy will make effective and safe navigation in the future. 
1.5 Outline Structure  
Chapter 1  Introduction 
This chapter provides the reader with background information on the evolution within 
radar, AIS and IBS leading up to the aim and objectives for the thesis. 
Chapter 2 Regulations and Literature Review 
In chapter two the thesis discusses relevant research regulations and rules including a 
short explanation of AIS. The chapter refers to accidents reports and the collision 
statistics during the last decades. The education and officers training are presented. 
Chapter 3  Research methods 
Chapter three describes the quantitative and qualitative methods used, explaining the 
validity and reliability of the report achieved through the three different field tests.  
The method of using 3 different approaches is described along with the limitations of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 4 Findings 
This chapter describes the field work, presenting and discussing the findings in the three 
individual areas. 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
The conclusion brings a complete layout of the thesis, answering each of the three 
objectives. 
Chapter 6 References 
The references are displayed in Harvard style. 
Chapter 7 
Six appendices are listed at the end of the thesis. 
2 Regulations and literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
During the last 10 years, navigators from the Royal Norwegian Navy have experienced 
the development away from paper charts and the development from stand alone 
navigational systems with radar as the only electronic aid to complex integrated systems 
(S. Nyhamn, Personal experience). The modernisation did not only promote safer and 
more effective navigation, but also presented certain implications that had to be dealt 
with (NNC, 2009). 
Due to the complexity of the IBS and the introduction of ECDIS in the past years, the 
radar has received less attention within procedure development, education and training 
in the Norwegian Navy (NNC, 2012).   
Radar has gone from being the sole means of control to one of many navigational tools 
within the IBS (ibid.). Although there is a general perception that radar is the most 
important electronic aid for anti collision and safe navigation, the focus of development, 
understanding and training has got competition from other electronic aids and a 
complex IBS and a more technology driven ship in general.  
The choice of literature reflects and supports the research objectives. 
In the RNoN there has not been any research investigating the utilisation of these aids 
for anti-collision. The studies within navigation in the Norwegian Navy have been 
discussed in two MSc’s and one PhD;  ECDIS vs ECS (Bøhn, 2011) , development of 
new anti-collision algorithms for radar (Grepne-Takle, 2011),  and a PhD in the area of 
Human Machine Interface and design of bridge system (HMI) on FPBs (Røed, 2007). 
In its research project 545, the Australian Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) 
describes the problem when the human element is not considered when designing 
highly automated bridge systems (MCA, 2007). 
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None of these reports are directly applicable as a basis for this study, but underlines the 
technological evolution and the necessity to do research in this area of interest. 
Mainly due to few units in the Navy there are few incidents described in empirical 
studies. The research on accidents from 1998-2005 (Gould et al., 2006) shows the 
performance shaping factors that can only partially be utilised for statistical purposes. 
This thesis reviews reports and statistics from civilian maritime agencies in Norway, 
United Kingdom, and Australia. 
This research mainly focuses on technical elements; it is a fact that there is a thin line 
between physical technical elements and the more human related elements as Røed 
(2007) explores in his PhD. Even if this is technical research, it is natural also to draw 
attention to the rules and regulations.  
2.2 Short description of AIS 
When set up, AIS is a 100% automatic ship-ship and ship-shore information exchange 
system. It uses 2 Very high frequency (VHF) channels for data exchange and Channel 
70 for automated administrative purposes. AIS broadcasts the ship’s position, speed, 
and navigational status at regular intervals. The information originates from the ship's 
navigational sensors.  
All the users transmit on the same two frequencies and in order to organize the digital 
traffic, AIS utilises the transmission protocol, the Self Organizing Time Division 
Multiple Access, SOTDMA. All ships reserve a time slot in the future simultaneously 
with present message. Time synchronization is vital for the system to work, and the AIS 
receiver uses a GPS time from an internal receiver. If GPS is not available, the AIS will 
not work. The transmitted position of the ship is primarily sent from the official position 
sensor, which in most cases is GPS. The digital transmission is able to carry a lot of 
information but in order to not overload the system, the information is prioritised and 
organised. The most important data is transmitted more often than less important data. 
The data is divided in three groups; Static, Voyage Related, or Dynamic data. 
“Static data” is fixed to the vessel, and is normally entered upon installation and 
broadcasted every 6 minute: 
 Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), Ships name, Call sign, IMO number, 
Type of Vessel, Length and beam, location of Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) antenna, and height over keel. 
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“Voyage Related Data” is manually entered data at the voyage start, and kept up to date 
during underway. This is broadcasted every 6 minutes: 
 Ship‘s static draught, destination, estimated time of arrival ( ETA), type of ship, 
hazardous cargo and number of person on board. 
“Dynamic data” is sensor data that changes with the ship motion. Depending on speed 
and the changing of heading, the interval can be from every 3 minutes (at anchor or less 
than 3 knots) to every 2 seconds (speed greater than 23 knots or speed between 14 and 
23 knots and changing course).  
 Ship’s position, time in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), course over ground 
(COG), speed over ground (SOG), heading, Rate of Turn. Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is indicated.  
The MMSI number is sent with every message to identify the sender even if it is 
categorised as “static data”. The system also has the possibility to send and receive text 
messages and has a built-in flexible message facility called AIS Binary Messages which 
allows development of the system in the future.  
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Figure 2-1: Overview of the AIS system (courtesy NNC) 
Figure 2-1 explains the whole system in a nutshell. The AIS link has the ability to reach 
another ship that is not visual because VHF propagation is better than that of radar due 
to the longer wavelength. The signals do not suffer from distortion as does the radar 
(rain, sea clutter). The figure also reveals this complexity and that is has become more 
than an anti-collision aid. An example of that is the launching of AIS satellites to keep 
better control of traffic. 
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2.3 Relevant research in the area 
 
The modern integrated radar in an IBS is very complex, having a variety of operational 
possibilities. In addition, the introduction of AIS has added more advantages, 
possibilities, and challenges.  
“Get Your Head Out Of Your AIS” is an example of article printed in the Windcheck 
Magazine in 2012 that focuses on the pitfalls of modern equipment. The author asserts 
that use of AIS may contribute to the loss of situation awareness (SA), making the 
operator make wrong decisions (Weiss, 2012). The author of this article who claims that 
AIS is making it more dangerous than before AIS, contends that this should be expected 
shortly after the introduction of a new system or invention. However, this article is from 
2012, 10 years after the IMO SOLAS Agreement that required that most vessels over 
300GT on international voyages to install an AIS transceiver. This indicates that there is 
still some work to be done to achieve full benefit of the new systems as well as trust by 
the users. 
The full potential of combining radar and AIS in an integrated bridge is yet to be fully 
researched. In “Integrated Bridge Systems vol. 1 RADAR and AIS” Dr. Norris  describes 
AIS as being at its infancy, and that lessons are still being learnt contrary to the radar 
that has been developed over 60 years. Shortcomings and usefulness in radar have been 
fully understood and it is still the main electronic aid for anti-collision (Norris, 2008). 
Even if Norris’ statement about AIS is from 2008, it still corresponds with the recent 
experiences from the RNoN. Nevertheless, the navy has experienced some improvement 
concerning AIS during the last years, especially regarding the willingness to change 
navigational status and voyage data i.e. destination and ETA. 
The purpose of the AIS is to be found in IMO’s Recommendation on Performance 
Standards for AIS (IMO, 1998), where IMO proclaims that AIS should: “improve the 
safety of navigation by assisting in the efficient navigation of ships.” On the other hand, 
the same resolution also states the following two purposes: 
1. AIS should be used in a ship-to-ship mode for collision avoidance 
2. AIS should be a mean for littoral states to obtain information about a ship and its 
cargo and as a Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) tool, i.e. ship-to-shore (traffic 
management). 
The IMO resolution does not make the main purpose very clear; people who do not 
work as navigators might easily believe that this is a handy system to keep track of 
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ships for economic, efficiency or safety purposes. Developers might see this as an 
opportunity to evolve AIS to better fit surveillance purposes that might overload the 
system with even more information e.g. with binary messages (Porthin et al., 2010).  
Collision avoidance is also a main task of the radar and the AIS making is clear that 
these two electronic aids must be used together. The combinations of these two aids 
imply some challenges that are thoroughly described by Norris (2008). The fundamental 
differences and their pros and cons are described in detail because it is absolutely 
essential for the understanding of the use of these aids by the navigators listed in Table 
2-1. The table gives an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of radar and AIS 
technology with regards to safe navigation and extracting target information. 
 
21 
 
 Radar and AIS compared 
Advantages Disadvantages  
R
a
d
a
r 
 Does not basically rely on any ‘off-
ship’ systems, such as GNSS or 
cooperative targets  
 Is naturally ship relative and sea 
stabilised1  
 Relatively difficult to jam or spoof  
 
 Suffers from rain and sea clutter 
problems which can easily obscure 
important targets  
 Suffers from being a ‘line-of sight’ 
system not able to see round 
headlands and islands, etc  
 Does not always give a good 
indication of heading on which 
collision avoidance rules are based  
 Detection of changes in speed and 
direction of targets suffers from 
significant latency issues  
A
IS
 
 Gives position, SOG, COG, heading 
and other target information, in 
principle as accurately as they are 
known on the target vessel  
 Changes in such data are rapidly 
transmitted to observing vessels with 
far less latency than radar  
 Transmissions are less influenced by 
ground screening effects and therefore 
can get data from non line-of-sight 
targets  
 Relies on target having a switched 
on AIS transponder  
 Relies on good installation and 
upkeep of target vessels’ AIS 
system  
 Relies on both target and own ship 
having good knowledge of their own 
absolute positions.  
 Total failure if GNSS fails at a 
system  
 
Table 2-1: Radar and AIS compared (Norris, 2013) 
It is also fundamental that not all navigators are aware of these differences at a 
sufficient level. Radar is a ship based system of which the user has full control, as 
opposed to the AIS system where the user just receives data without knowledge of the 
quality. Even if it is an obvious statement that could be superfluous, the IMO resolution 
about guidelines for the use of AIS (IMO, 2001) asserts that “the accuracy of AIS 
information received is only as good as the accuracy of the AIS information 
transmitted.” Hence, AIS should not be used as sole means of determining collision 
avoidance action. However, data from AIS is fast and accurate and if correct, the 
                                                 
1
 Sea stabilization is a mode of display whereby own ship and all targets are referenced to the sea, using 
gyro heading and single axis log water speed inputs. 
Ground stabilization is a mode of display whereby own ship and all targets are referenced to the ground, 
using ground track or set and drift inputs. 
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absolute best data to base the decision on, but since you can never be 100% sure it must 
be compared with the radar (Norris, 2008). Nevertheless, it is quite understandable that 
the navigators regard the AIS as the truth simply because it normally is. This means that 
levels of effective and relevant use of these aids are a function of education, training, 
and procedures. 
Both systems provide closest point of approach (CPA), and time to the closest point of 
approach (TCPA) which constitutes the main information needed to evaluate a situation. 
In addition, both have other functions that are unique for each of them. AIS may 
provide visually displayed information to the user if the contact is turning, but radar can 
depict trails which show the past track of all visible targets as “smears” on the display 
as shown in Figure 2-2.  
 
Figure 2-2: Trails and EBL (courtesy Dr Andy Norris)  
Trails are useful in all radar modes and on recent, modern radars in the RNoN the most 
used mode is “north up fixed centre, true vector and trails” (NUP/FT) which is a mix of 
relative motion and true motion. It really is a relative motion because ship is not moving 
whereas land is moving. The smart effect in this mode, that makes the user believe it is 
true motion, is that the radar is not giving trail on echoes with the same speed and 
heading, but opposite compared to own ship i.e. they are not contacts but e.g. an island. 
In this way only targets will have trails, thus being easy to spot. There is, however, a 
condition that speed and heading input are very accurate. If not, the radar will interpret 
 
23 
an island as a moving target. This mode is described in Radar performance standards,   
paragraph 5.20.1 (IMO, 2004). 
Other important factors that confuse the navigators is what kind of speed input own and 
target ship have, as well as the use of true and relative vectors or electronic bearing line 
(EBL) as shown in Figure 2-2.  
Heading and position input are also important, but not disputed as most ships use GPS 
and gyro input, which do not cause the same level of confusion. Both Norris (2008) and 
Kjerstad (2008) discuss this issue to a great extent. They both make it clear that the 
consequence of the choice of speed input must be understood because it can be crucial 
to situation awareness and to the decisions made to avoid a collision. Norris points it out 
this way: 
“Radar and AIS data can only be used safely if there is a good understanding of 
true and relative vectors. A poor understanding can result in a major collision. 
Unfortunately, accidents caused by incorrect interpretation of vector 
information still occur”(Norris, 2008). 
The report from MAIB in the UK after the collision between MV Spring Bok and MV 
Gas Arctic underline the statement by Norris.  
“The master selected true vectors and true trails for targets on the ARPA radar. 
This selection had the disadvantage of giving no relative information of a target, 
unless it was selected for display, which the master did not do.”(MAIB, 2012) 
This topic is also described in the user manual for the SM 10 radar where the subject is 
highlighted, stating that it is of outmost importance that the operator is aware of the 
basic differences of true and relative presentation and stabilisation mode when assessing 
the traffic situation using vectors (Kongsberg, 2005). The users normally complain 
about the shortcomings of the manuals provided by the producers, but in this case they 
have gone beyond the normal level of user manuals and into a textbook mode. 
The use of relative vectors is the best and easiest tool to discover if the target is on 
collision course or not. However, the deliberate toggling between true and relative 
vectors gives the best SA. EBL and optical bearing are also an easy solution that gives a 
good indication of collision danger. 
The confusion of true and relative mode of radar is also discussed in the Kongsberg user 
manual (ibid) and by Norris (2008, p.70). Norris describes that there are three main 
independent ways of detecting and evaluating the risk of collision: visual, by radar or by 
AIS. The Norwegian Navy basically follows these principles, but is in general mostly 
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focused on controlling the positioning of own ship and not anti-collision. The bridge 
manual for the coastal corvettes, the Skjold class, determines three different methods of 
controlling the position: visual, combined radar and visual and only radar (MTBTS, 
2009). The fact that the whole manual is dedicated to ECDIS reflects the navy’s centre 
of attention after the transition to paperless navigation. The manual, however, only 
describes radar in a restricted visibility scenario, not in anti-collision. 
The IBS on the FPBs and the frigates are produced by Kongsberg Defence Systems. On 
the company web page the bridge is described as a “Tactical Bridge System that 
features an integrated solution designed to support the navigator, (Kongsberg, 2013)” 
but the system is based on the type approved
2
 civilian bridge system from Kongsberg 
Maritime, which implies that the IBS meets most of the terms regulated by IMO. 
It is also important to mention other functions that are designed to assist the operator in 
the process of situation awareness and avoiding collision. Two of them are “Fusion of 
targets” and “Automatic acquisition”. 
Fusion means that an AIS target and a radar target are identified to be one target based 
on certain criteria. The difference in position and speed should be less than a 
configurable limit, and both criteria need to be fulfilled to fuse the two sets of data into 
one target.  
IMO is using the word “associated” if the criteria are met (Norris, 2008). This function 
can be an advantage because the screen will be de-cluttered as there is only one target 
vector displayed, thus adding to the SA. However, the danger is obvious if there in fact 
are two targets close together. Even if this tool is at hand, it does not mean that the 
operator can leave the system to itself. The system puts a lot of demands on the 
navigators to control the automated systems, evaluating whether the correct decisions 
have been made.  
The automatic acquisition function is in a similar domain as fusion. On the basis of 
configured values set by the operator, the system will automatically track radar echoes, 
activating AIS targets.  
                                                 
2
 “Type Approved” means that it has been tested to ensure compliance with the 
Performance Standards specified by IMO and the IEC 
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Figure 2-3:  Auto acquisition menu on Kongsberg DataBridge10 radar 
The Norwegian coast has an infinite number of rocks and islands. The challenge is that 
rocks and island are easily confused to be ship echoes, which is why automatic 
acquisition is not very much used in an inshore environment. However, there is a 
possibility to use barrier lines that could filter out the non-ship echoes. While the 
automatic acquisition area moves with the vessel, the barrier lines are geographically 
fixed limitations for the automatic target acquisition. Targets are not tracked behind the 
barrier lines. Barrier lines are stored for later use and can be activated and edited 
(Kongsberg, 2005). 
The AIS system is based on exchanging digital data between users. Even if there is a 
limit to how much data can be included, and how fast it can be sent, a large amount of 
information is being communicated. This is in fact where it differs from radar, but AIS 
gives much needed information to the users. Some of this information, e.g. name of the 
ship, was often communicated by voice on the VHF prior to the AIS. We could assume 
that this would contribute positively to the navigators’ SA. It definitely does, but there 
is always a down side. From 2004, the Norwegian Naval Centre (NNC) has gathered the 
experience after the introduction of ECDIS and IBS systems in the navy. One of the 
findings was that the navigators regularly found themselves in a state of information 
overload (NNC, 2006). In many cases, more available data was welcoming and 
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interesting, but could lead to a delay in decision making, and in addition, the data was 
often interpreted as the truth without any critical evaluation.  
The study of the development after the introduction of IBS also found that the new 
systems required more training as displayed in Figure 2-4. In the figure it is explained 
that until the introduction of IBS, the education and training were able to keep up with 
the need. However, after IBS, the need for education and training increased but was in 
fact reduced. The reduction had partly to do with lack of resources and partly to do with 
the belief that the new systems were easy to understand and learn (NNC, 2006).  
 
Figure 2-4: Complexity and education in integrated bridge systems (courtesy NNC) 
 "Keep it simple, stupid"
3
 (KISS) was a design principle noted by the U.S. Navy in 
1960. The U.S. Navy "Project KISS" of 1960, headed by Rear Admiral Paul D. Stroop, 
stated that most systems would work best if they were kept simple and not complex 
(Dalzell, 2009). In light of the last decades’ evolution, it might be fair to say that the 
KISS principle has been abandoned in the new integrated bridges operating in a highly 
technological, sophisticated, and complex environment.  
In 2013 NNC published a military publication, Navy Military Publication (translated), 
SMP 500. This publication is based on 10 years of experience, containing 
                                                 
3
 The acronym has also been interpreted “Keep it simple, straightforward” 
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recommendations, explanations and regulations that are aimed to make it easier for the 
departments in charge of education and training and for the navigators themselves. 
 
2.3.1 Investigations and statistics on collision  
In 2011 NMD issued a report, Marine casualties 2000 – 2010 (NMD, 2010).  Figure 2-5 
displays the evolution of collisions within Norwegian waters from 2000 to 2010. 
Despite a positive trend until 2008, the two last years have revealed an increase in 
collisions. In 2010, 24 collisions involving 44 vessels were recorded.  
 
Figure 2-5: Numbers of collisions within Norwegian waters, 2000-2010. (Courtesy 
NMD) 
 
Figure 2-6: Near accidents in 2010 by type of accident. (Courtesy NMD) 
As Figure 2-6 shows, there have also been 7 near collisions in 2010 (the record started 
in 2008). In the decade covered by the report, there have been 7 fatalities as a result of 
collisions. The report does not include statistics regarding the reason for the collisions 
because in recent years, instead of stating human or technical errors, explanatory models 
have been developed that emphasize an understanding of systems, taking into account 
various factors of the direct reasons. In general, the report lists recurring factors as 
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failure to use the look-out, the distribution of tasks on board, administrative burdens, 
inattention, too little sleep or shift schedules that stretch over many weeks, inadequate 
communication, lack of maintenance, ergonomic solutions, etc. 
For comparison, the report from The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in 
the United Kingdom analysed the use of radar. The most common contributory factors 
in all the collisions were poor lookout and poor use of radar. The report also determines 
that “a proper lookout is achieved in a number of ways, not only visually; radar, AIS, 
radio, and telephones all need to be monitored” (MAIB, 2004).    
 
Figure 2-7: Use of radar, Vessels contravened Rules 7(b) or 7(c) in COLREG (Courtesy 
MAIB) 
The same report also points out that 73% of the vessels involved in collision did not use 
the radar properly and potentially contravened COLREG 7(b) or 7(c) (IMO, 1972) 
which states (Figure 2-7): 
Rule 7(b) – proper use shall be made of radar equipment fitted and operational, 
including long range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and 
radar plotting or equivalent observation of detected objects.  
Rule 7(c) – Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, 
especially scanty radar information. 
Looking into different individual accident reports from e.g. MAIB and Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), there are many examples emphasizing the 
aforementioned findings; 
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Although he could have displayed the target information on the radar display, he 
chose not to and the opportunity to visually monitor the target’s data was not 
taken (MAIB, 2013). 
The master selected true vectors and true trails for targets on the ARPA radar. 
This selection had the disadvantage of giving no relative information of a target, 
unless it was selected for display, which the master did not do (ibid.). 
The Bridgemaster display was equipped with automatic acquisition and 
tracking, and guard zone facilities, but these were not used (MAIB, 2005). 
There is little doubt that a correctly tuned radar and an appropriately setup AIS 
unit on board Global Supplier would have aided in avoiding the collision (ATSB, 
2010) 
All the reports clearly underline that there are challenges in the use of the modern aids 
to avoid collisions. Several of the reports also mention poor use of AIS, varying from 
not being used at all to not fully understanding the AIS system.  
 
2.4 Regulations and rules 
2.4.1 International regulations for preventing collisions at sea 
The most important rules for avoiding collision are of course the International 
regulations for preventing collisions at sea from 1972, being implemented in 1977 
(COLREG) with amendments (IMO, 1972).  
The most relevant for the use of radar and AIS are in Part B Rules 5 (look-out), 7 (Risk 
of collision) and 19 (Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility) (Appendix A). 
Rule 5 states that “there shall be a proper look-out by signal and hearing as well as by 
all available means to appraisal the situation and the risk of collision.” AIS is not 
mentioned in the COLREG but it is agreed that the wording “by all available means” 
must include AIS (Norris, 2008, Patraiko, 2013). 
According to the report (MAIB, 2004) 65% of the vessels involved in a collision 
contravened rule 5. A proper look-out is not only visual, but includes all electronic 
means that can help in assessing potential dangerous situations. 
Rule 7 discusses how to determinate collision risk. Again, it declares that all available 
means shall be used. This rule indirectly indicates that there is a need to understand the 
limitations and possibilities of the equipment.  
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In cases where a current is affecting a ship, there is not a good indication of the heading 
on the radar, even if it is in a sea stabilised mode. In these cases, target heading from the 
AIS can make a good overview of the situation, thus giving the potential to follow rule 
5. 
Rule 7 c is relevant since it articulates the following: “Assumptions shall not be made 
on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar information.”  
Received AIS data of which the operator has no control, must by itself be regarded as 
inadequate and unreliable data the same way as the rule states that you should not rely 
on insufficient radar data. 
Rule 19 describes the conduct of vessels in restricted visibility. Radar was for a long 
time the only aid that would help in low visibility and, of course, not only concerning 
anti collision, but in general for safe navigation. On the other hand, AIS has added a 
dimension as it can deliver important information when there is poor visibility. 
However, AIS is most relevant as an aid to avoid collision, making it easier to comply 
with the instructions in rule 19. 
AIS is not mentioned in the COLREG, in other words, it is important for the users to 
realise this, and one should rather use AIS as an extra aid to radar information. 
2.4.2 Conventions and performance standards  
New ships in RNoN like the Skjold class and the frigates fulfill the performance 
standards for IBS (IMO, 1996), Radar (IMO, 2004) and AIS (IMO, 1998).  
However, due to specific military operational requirements, there are several 
dissimilarities with a civilian system.  
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Figure 2-8: IBS on modern naval ships 
In most cases features and functions are added, e.g. inertial navigational systems (INaS) 
which are included as sensors to the bridge and the weapon system. There is a complex 
level of integration with the operation room (see Figure 2-8), and several types of radars 
serving tactical purposes can be added in addition to the standard 3 and 9 GHz type. 
The main goal when designing the new bridge system is to comply with as many 
civilian rules as possible. In IMO’s SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Convention chapter 
V; Safety of Navigation, warships are excepted to follow the rules but are encouraged to 
act in a consistent manner, as reasonable and practicable as possible (IMO, 2002). 
Chapter V, regulation 19, states that ships above 300 gross ton built after 1 July 2002 
must have an electronic plotting aid, or other means, to plot electronically the range and 
bearing of targets to determine collision risk (ibid, Chapter V – 1/7/02 paragraph 2.5.5 ).  
For ships of 500 gross tonnages and upwards, the convention also demands an 
automatic tracking aid for the automatic plotting of targets to determine the collision 
risk. In addition, all vessels above 500 GT (300GT if internationally trading) must be 
fitted with AIS. 
The variable parameters are usually tonnage of the ships, passenger or cargo ship and if 
they are engaged on international voyages or not. Table 2-2 from “Revised performance 
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standards for radar equipment” gives an overview of requirement to which SOLAS 
applies (IMO, 2004). 
 
Table 2-2: Differences in the performance requirements for various sizes/categories of 
ship/craft to which SOLAS applies (IMO, 2004) 
In 2008 the radar performance standard was amended to include the display of AIS as 
an overlay on radar and radar/AIS association capabilities to reduce display ‘clutter’.  
The standard also depicts a comprehensive description of requirements for a target 
tracking (TT
4
), Acquisition, AIS and radar target data in paragraphs 5.25 to 5.28 (IMO, 
2004). 
The convention also gives the regulation for ships that have to be fitted with AIS. These 
are all detailed rules about radar and AIS, but the facts are that most of the modern ships 
have installed AIS as they have experienced the benefit. Nearly all modern radars have 
included tracking and plotting capability. Even leisure craft radars may have a form of 
automatic plotting functionality. It is not possible, for example, to purchase a 
Kongsberg system without all these features.  
For comparison, all ships in the Norwegian navy are equipped with a complete set of 
these navigational aids and functions independent of tonnage. 
2.4.3 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 
The 1978 STCW Convention was the first to establish basic requirements on training, 
certification and watchkeeping for seafarers on an international level.  
The STCW has been amended twice, in 1995 (in force 1997) and in 2010 (in force 
2012) to bring it up to date. Part A of STCW 95 is mandatory, while part B is 
                                                 
4
 TT has now superseded the acronym ARPA which is not used in the latest 2004 IMO document, but is 
still used in IMO training documents. 
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recommended. NMA has ratified the code, and in 2012 issued updated requirements 
stating the required level of knowledge that is mandatory to reach during the maritime 
education. For deck officer education, Chapter II; “Master and deck department” 
describes the overall requirements relevant for this thesis. As a result, the NMA has 
issued requirements for AIS and ECDIS for the maritime education institutions to 
comply with (NMA, 2013). The new requirements for AIS and ECDIS are well 
formulated and are up to date, having been included in the education and training in 
RNoN for all navigators in the Norwegian navy.  
One aim in the AIS requirement is formulated the following way (translated from 
Norwegian): 
"AIS Information is interpreted and analyzed properly taking into account the 
equipment's limitations, other systems/sensors and the prevailing circumstances 
and conditions" (ibid) 
To be able to apply to this requirement after the formal education it is vital to continue 
the familiarisation and training on board own ship and maintain the knowledge 
regularity. 
2.5 An overview of the education and training in the RNoN 
Lack of knowledge and proper training are repeated numerous times in accidents 
reports. All the students training to be a navigators at the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy (RNoNA) receive full theoretical education in accordance with  
 ”Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping” (STCW 95), up to the highest 
level of deck officer certificate. The implementation of the last amendment from 2012 
“the Manilla amendment” is an ongoing activity at the NNC. In addition to this 
theoretical education, the education accommodates the requirement set by the RNoN. 
These requirements are adding elements that are not mandatory by IMO through STCW 
95. Figure 2-9 visually describes that the education includes all the requirements from 
IMO as well as the extra requirements that the navy and coastguard have required. 
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Figure 2-9: Illustration of the education covering both IMO and own needs. 
The most important and time demanding activity for the students is the live navigation 
on the two training ships specially made for the purpose. The ships are only 50 feet but 
still have a full IBS and can do speed up to 43 knots (Appendix B). This navigation 
practise for students still at the academy drastically reduces the time needed to train 
navigation at the operational units. 
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Figure 2-10: Theoretical and practical navigation education at the Naval Academy 
(courtesy NNC) 
The overview in Figure 2-10 illustrates the students live and simulator experience 
before they start their operational career on board. During the studies at the naval 
academy, the future navigators also complete the IMO ECDIS Model Course nr 1.27 
and AIS Operator Course, IMO model course nr 1.34. The automatic radar plotting aid 
(ARPA)
5
 module is included in the STCW education. However, this only gives them a 
kick start on the path to a fully qualified Officer of the watch (OOW). The 
responsibility for this “on the job training” belongs to the operational ships and the 
training centres for each type of ship. This training is absolutely essential as it is 
important that users are familiar with the bridge system as also described in Norris 
(2008). IMO has underlined this aspect since familiarisation is a requirement of the 
STCW and the ISM.  
In the magazine, Navigare issued by NMD in 2007, the director of the NMD, Rune 
Teisrud, addresses the topic as a reaction to a major accident within Norwegian littoral 
waters. He is worried about the increasing numbers of accidents. The article makes a 
point of the connection between causes of the accidents and the navigators’ 
                                                 
5
 The abbreviation ARPA has been replaced by TT in the radar performance standard but is still used in 
the IMO training documents. 
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incompetence. When he articulated ”appropriate certificates are not enough” (Teisrud, 
2007), this was coinciding with the  Navy’s experiences which at the time heightened 
the focus of this question. The RNoN has thus recognised that the certificates in and of 
themselves will not constitute sufficient knowledge for the navigator. Perhaps the most 
important part of the navigator’s path to becoming an OOW starts after graduation from 
the academy.  
The STCW 95 code, part A Chapter VIII describes in paragraph 36 the requirement for 
the navigators to be thoroughly familiar with the use of all electronic navigational aids, 
including their capabilities and limitations. This requirement points out the essence and 
the conditions that should be met in order to utilise the different navigational aids to 
their maximum extent. It is, however, recognised that this has become increasingly 
challenging on a par with the technological evolution. 
In most cases the training to become an OOW is described, following a planned 
process. However, there is a challenge to make it more systematic and quality assured 
for all navigators from start to finish of the training period. In 2010 Frode Røte analysed 
how the training towards OOW was executed on the Fridtjof Nansen class frigate. He 
concluded that there were too many pedagogical differences from ship to ship, and that 
the training processes were too random. The students requested more alignment in the 
learning process (Røte, 2010). 
2.6 Summery and emerging issues 
There seems to be a clear trend that the development of new functions and more 
adjustment possibilities on radar, as well as the implementation of the AIS system, are 
not automatically appreciated and utilised by the operators. There are probable several 
possible reasons for this. Are the navigators in the RNoN aware of this, and do they 
make the most out of their equipment, or are they overwhelmed and/or not properly 
trained? Do they use the traditional “easy” aids as relative vectors and optical bearing to 
asses a situation or are they studying the data delivered by the computer system? 
The RNoN uses a lot of resources on education and training, but after the technical 
“revolution” in navigation coinciding with reductions in activities reducing “on the job 
training,” there is a clear question if the operators are properly educated to handle the 
equipment in a sufficient manner. It is also a fact that accidents still happen and even 
though an important factor is human error, it is much more interesting to look at why 
there still are so many human errors when the aids are getting better and better, or are 
they? 
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3 Research method 
The thesis applies both qualitative and quantitative methods. This has made it possible 
to compare the quantitative data with the qualitative observations. In their book, 
Forskningsmetoder for økonomisk-administrative fag  (transl. Research methods for 
business and administration) Johannessen et al. explain the two methods as two 
different directions, emphasising that they may very well be used together and that they 
must not be assumed to be contradictory to each other (Johannessen et al., 2004). 
During the research this proved correct as this made it possible to discover possible 
connecting threads. The quantitative part provides a measurable data set whereas the 
qualitative data adds the understanding of why things or processes occur. 
The method used to achieve relevant data was to do observations from three different 
angles and thus the field work was divided into three parts;  
 Live observation on board the Skjold class 
 Observations on simulator models for the Skjold class, the Fridtjof Nansen class, 
and for a corvette type (simulator model) ships 
 Evaluation of knowledge through questionnaire interviews 
The live sailing was a 600 nm transit inshore Norway coastline both in light and dark 
conditions and at varying weather conditions. The navigators’ experience ranged from 
1- 8 years. Obviously, the positive is that the observations are from live operations, but 
the disadvantage is that it is not possible to create incidents. 
In the simulator two different areas and scenarios were designed to achieve as many 
relevant responses as possible. As opposed to live sailing, the simulator itself may affect 
the behavior of the officers to a certain degree. However, since the simulator is very 
realistic and familiar to the officers, the observations carried out are considered relevant 
and of high value. 
Within the limitations of the questions, the questionnaire measured the knowledge of 
the operators regarding the understanding and use of radar and AIS at two levels of 
technical degrees of difficulty. 
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On board the Skjold class and in the simulator the main focus was to observe activity 
within the categories listed in Table 3-1. 
Radar AIS Radar and AIS 
 True or relative 
vectors 
 Use of EBL 
 Use of trails 
 Time of target 
detection 
 Search for targets 
 Adjustment of radar: 
range, clutter, pulse 
length 
 Target activated 
or sleeping 
 Use of automatic 
activation 
 Information 
reading 
 Discovery of 
targets without 
AIS 
 Procedure before departure 
 Collision alarm 
 Comparison of AIS track 
with radar track 
 Use of automatic acquisition 
 Use of  target fusion 
 Use of communication 
Other 
 Use of look-out 
 Use of visual aids 
 Use of OBD (Figure 3-1) 
Table 3-1: List of possible observation elements that is related to objective 1 
 
Figure 3-1: Optical Bearing Device (OBD) integrated in IBS (courtesy NNC) 
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The elements in Table 3-1 are all possible observations that are associated with the first 
objective:  
“Identify and examine the use of AIS and radar in anti-collision by live observations 
and simulated tests.” 
The second objective 
“Explore the knowledge of radar and AIS use relevant for anti-collision” 
has been analysed to measure the level of radar and AIS knowledge that the navigators 
possess.  
Based on the outcome of the two first objectives, the third objective 
“Formulate recommendations on the education and training within radar and AIS” 
will indicate a possible need to change the training and procedures. 
The method of doing observations on a naval ship on operational duty was challenging 
and timely both in regards to planning as well as the execution of the tasks. However, 
live observations deliver relevant and state of the art data. Even if the actual sailing was 
carried out in a few days, much work had to be prepared before the actual sailing 
occurred. The simulator scenarios were somewhat easier to set up but still it was a 
challenge to coordinate all the teams and all the scenarios. Several assistants contributed 
to a smooth and controlled two days of testing. It was important to do the questionnaire 
after the live sailing and the simulator tests, to ensure that the candidates were not 
affected by the aim of the research. 
The data from live sailing was only the written observation as no recordings or pictures 
were allowed. In the simulator, however, the data was gathered by means of written 
observations and by video.  
 
3.1.1 Reliability and validity 
A high level of reliability and validity has been important for the process. Validity is 
how well the findings, measurement and conclusion correspond to the real world. The 
word "valid" is derived from the Latin, validus, meaning strong. Due to variety of the 
three different tests, there is a strong and solid connection between the thesis and the 
reality. It can further be explained by the question “Does the research actually measure 
what it claims to measure?” (Johannessen et al., 2004).  
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Reliability describes how trustworthy and reliable the data is. It is connected to the data 
in the research? Which method is used for collection? Which data is used and how is it 
used? (ibid.). This thesis employs three different approaches: questionnaire, live 
observation and simulator tests. For the quantitative part a questionnaire was used 
(Appendix C and D). 19 officers representing approximate 20% of the total navigators 
in the RNoN were interviewed. They had experience from 0 to 8 years, but from only 
two different types of ships. However, all were trained on a modern IBS which was 
important for the thesis. The 19 officers represent approx 35%-40% of the officers in 
the navy with IBS training. 
The live tests have good validity as navigators are observed during real navigation. 
Nevertheless, with live observation the value depended on relevant incidents to happen. 
Hence, the number of incidents might not be as large as one would have hoped for. On 
the other hand, the data appeared reliable due to real observation during real operations. 
The live observation might also have a weakness being observed on board only one 
ship. However, there were different navigators who navigated over a long period of 
time, and the fact that all the Skjold vessels have the same operational tasks, operating 
in a similar manner can be seen to deliver a relatively acceptable solution. This 
considered, the collected data should also represent the real world and be of good 
validity.  
The questionnaire was presented as interviews with model answers that gave pre-
planned scores. All the officers were thus equally treated and there was very low degree 
of misunderstandings. This approach added good reliability to the research. 
In the simulator there was ample opportunity to test similar scenarios on different 
teams. The same scenario was repeated several times, making the findings produce high 
reliability. The advantages of using simulators are that it was possible to create as many 
scenarios as deemed necessary. In addition, it was possible to make sure that the targets 
ships behaved in a way that created the desired anti-collision response.  
According to Johannessen et al. (2004), observations can be divided in, among others, 
structured and unstructured observations. The thesis mainly aimed for a structured 
observation using a track sheet that focused on the observations that were relevant to 
anti-collision activity (Appendix E). Nevertheless, in a complex scenario it is not 
always easy to foresee what will happen next when underway e.g. changing speed can 
inflict the next happening. Consequently, it turned out to be a combination of structured 
and unstructured data. This made it particularly important to sum up all the observations 
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shortly after the tests (Johannessen et al., 2004). All the findings were organised within 
14 days.  
3.2 Limitations 
The apparent limitation in the research is that only military ships are investigated. On 
the other hand, the IBSs in this research are modern and very similar to civilian bridge 
systems.  
The ships in this research are capable of sailing in open sea where navigators use 
slightly different procedures compared to closed waters procedures. Meanwhile, the 
different scenarios are all in littoral waters, giving a better outcome as the navigation in 
these waters is much more challenging and thus more relevant for exploration of the 
thesis problem.  
Value has been added when investigating ships that had the possibility of sailing at high 
speed; this is an increase in the level of difficulty. On a naval ship, speed is a force 
multiplier
6
 which the navigators have to master.  
This thesis did not look at navigation in a simulated wartime or conflict scenario which 
would result in a much more dynamic and unpredictable navigation, possibly reducing 
the value of this study. 
The thesis focuses primarily on the technical use of radar, AIS and other anti-collision 
aids, not reflecting on the psychological factors, yet recognising that these factors have 
become increasingly interesting when evaluating an IBS navigational team. 
 
                                                 
6
 In military usage, a force multiplier refers to an attribute or a combination of attributes which makes a 
given force more effective than that same force would be without it. 
 
42 
4 Findings 
4.1 Introduction to the live observations 
All the observations were registered on board the Skjold Class high speed craft 
(Appendix F). The only task carried out by the ship was high speed inshore navigation 
which varied from open to very narrow waters. The team navigated unaware of the 
detailed purpose of the observations which was to observe the navigators’ use of radar 
and AIS as aids in preventing and avoiding collision. No specific scenarios were 
initialised. 
The testing was conducted during the summer, and the area covered was Narvik to 
Bergen, a distanced of approx 600 nautical miles, covered over ca 36 hours.  
The ship navigated both at daytime and at night time, but in northern Norway it did not 
turn dark due to the midnight sun. Navigation did occur in the dark; however, this took 
place on the last night in the area north of Bergen which is also the most demanding 
sailing area. As the weather also got worse in this area it became natural to rely more on 
radar and AIS.  
The observations are divided into 5 parts and are in chronological order. 
First leg (part 1, 2 and 3) without darkness was from Narvik area to Trondheim area. 
Second leg (part 4 and 5) was from Trondheim inshore leads to Bergen. 
The detailed routes of navigation are restricted due to military regulations, and cannot 
be disclosed. This will, however, not reduce the output of the thesis.  
During the observations described in this thesis, there were never any dangerous or 
close-to-dangerous situations. 
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4.1.1 Organisation of the Skjold class IBS 
 
Figure 4-1: The organisation of a Skjold class bridge 
As shown in Figure 4-1 the Skjold bridge is designed for two operators (OOW and the 
assistant) but has also been specified as a one man bridge. However, in the field tests, 
the conditions demanded that always two navigators were present. These two were 
constantly evaluating which tasks to prioritise, dividing the tasks between them to be 
able to perform safe and efficient navigation. The screens are multi functional and can 
be configured to show ECDIS, radar or conning. This gives flexibility, but some 
functions can only be operated by the OOW or the assistant. All officers in the role of 
assistant had navigation education, some of them were trainees and occasionally they 
were qualified OOW. The commanding officer (CO) would at times overlook the 
navigation.   
4.1.2 Live sailing, part 1. Through open waters in the Vestfjord,  
Even if the checklist for departure includes control of the radar, it was not tested and 
adjusted prior to departure. This was probably due to the good weather. 
In the first part, the navigators practised “radar control” in narrow waters which means 
that restricted visibility is simulated. The speed was 42 knots and the radar was mainly 
used for positioning of own ship. Several targets appeared along the route but no 
specific anti-collision incident occurred in this part. However, the general experiences 
were: 
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 When the radar was turned on, it was not immediately adjusted for optimal picture 
quality. The visibility was very good with zero wave height, i.e. no effort was 
made to optimise the radar picture even if the purpose was to train control by 
radar. Nevertheless, the picture quality was sufficient to discover the upcoming 
targets and positioning of the ship  
 Parallel indexing (PI) was extensively used for controlling the ships position. Gain 
and clutter control was adjusted to optimise for PI navigation which took most of 
the focus, thus searching for other ships did not have highest priority 
 The radar mode was “north up fixed centre, true vector and trails” (NUP/FT) 
which is the most used mode 
 Log input was “ground” and “trails” were off all the time. It did not seem that 
these settings were deliberately set for a reason 
 Several targets both with and without AIS were discovered. Most were too far 
away to be a potential navigation danger but one vessel came close and was 
avoided by changing course. No electronic calculations were made and neither 
relative vectors nor Electronic Bearing line (EBL) facilities were used 
In open waters progressing at high speed, it seemed very convenient, practical and fast 
to avoid a target by changing heading which is in according with COLREG Rule 8C and 
described by Cockcroft and Lameijer in their book, Collision avoidance rules (2011). 
Following this principle definitely worked, but did not add much learning experience 
regarding use of other anti-collisions aids. 
4.1.3 Live sailing, part 2. Bodoe area north in open to narrow waters 
In this part the vessel entered narrow waters and the control was changed to “visual 
control” but the speed was still 42 knots. The visibility was very good making it easy to 
visually detect two contacts on port bow. As they were both estimated to be of no 
danger, they were not tracked and the AIS information was of no of interest. The AIS 
targets were left in “sleeping” mode.  
An AIS advantage over radar is that a target behind an island can be detected and in this 
case an AIS contact that turned out to be a fast ferry that was displayed on the ECDIS 
and the radar quite early (see Figure 4-2). The operators had the opportunity to 
investigate this target by reading the relevant AIS data. With a potential relative speed 
of about 70 knots there was a risk for close encounter after turning starboard. However, 
the AIS target was never activated, and it turned out to have low speed, increasing speed 
after being visually detected at the same time as own ship speed was reduced.  
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Figure 4-2: Part 2, entering inshore 
4.1.4 Live sailing, part 3. Area Bodoe north in very narrow waters  
In part 3 the navigators were practising high speed navigation in very narrow waters 
with focus on optical control of both positioning of own ship and detecting other ships. 
In this period there was no effort made to search for AIS or radar contacts. Optical 
control seemed to be the best way to do this kind of navigation and the two navigators 
used all their focus on positioning based on visual observation. The area was cluttered 
with several islands that made it difficult to single out target echoes on the radar; hence 
the radar did not provide any easy target indication. Nevertheless, the AIS would be 
useful to spot potential targets along the route, bearing in mind that not all vessels 
within these narrow waters are obliged to carry AIS. 
4.1.5 Live sailing, part 4. From Bodoe and southwards in open and narrow waters. 
The conditions were very similar to part 1 regarding high speed, daylight conditions, 
and calm sea. At departure, again the radar was not checked. The first part of the 
navigation was carried out with “visual control”. When own ship approached  narrow 
waters, preparing two significant turns, two vessels were detected (see Figure 4-3), one 
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visual and one on AIS. Both targets were a potential danger, generating a lot of focus 
from both navigators.  
 
 
Figure 4-3: Part 4, passing and overtaking of contacts 
 
Both contacts (large fishing vessels) transmitted AIS data, but the navigators did not 
activate the AIS target, thus no further information was gained. However, the collision 
alarm worked as it is independent of AIS targets being activated or not, but due to 
several alterations of own ship course, the alarm criteria were constantly changing, 
giving the alarm little value. 
Relative vectors were not used, and the deviations were based on visual observations 
which resulted in several, perhaps unnecessary, deviations. 
In addition to sorting out how to pass and overtake these two vessels, the OOW had a 
lot to do with adjusting the raid control (adjusting the air pressure that lifts the vessel) 
and communication with the engine room. In other words, at this point the OOW’s 
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workload was quite extensive, simultaneously having to keep up with the ECDIS 
picture. 
The high speed on own ship made the overtaking of ships a near constant activity, but at 
the same time challenging as there usually was not much time to decide on the best way 
to overtake. In spite of that, the contacts were passed in high speed in a safe and 
controlled manner as depicted by the COLREG Rule nr 8C. An alteration in heading 
will normally be more effective than a change of speed to avoid close quarters which is 
what Cockcroft and Lameijer describes in his  guide to the COLREG (2011). The 
Skjold class followed this recommendation at this incidents and it turned out to be the 
most used method to avoid traffic. Nevertheless, no electronic aids were used not even 
for training purposes. 
 
4.1.6 Live sailing, part 5. In area Aalesund, narrow waters, in darkness with 
restricted visibility 
The main lead north of Aalesund is an area with alternating narrow and open waters. 
Rain and darkness gave limited visibility of about 1-3nm and the speed was 20 knots. 
The control mode was “combined radar and visual”.  
As own ship passed the narrow “Lepsoeyrev” (see Figure 4-4), a contact was detected 
further south. The target was assessed as a potential danger, and the process of how to 
pass it started. Own ship seamed to have right of way but after a while it looked as if the 
contact intended to sail north to the Vigra fjord. Based on that, the navigators decided to 
turn port to solve the situation. It looked as the contact was unsure about our ship’s 
intentions as it altered course two or three times. 
Even if the visibility was so low that only the target’s navigational lights were visible, 
the navigators did not utilise radar or AIS to their full extent. The AIS target was never 
activated and the data never read, nor was the target contacted on VHF communication. 
The radar operator adjusted the gain and clutter to achieve the best radar picture and the 
contact was tracked, but the decisions were mainly made after a visual evaluation. 
Dealing with this contact took all navigators’ attention and no effort was made to search 
ahead for possible upcoming new targets. As the speed was 20 knots there was time to 
utilise the electronic information to a greater extent in addition to the visual 
observations carried out. The contact was passed in a safe manner and there was no 
danger at any time.  
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Figure 4-4: Part 5, passing of a target in darkness and at low visibility 
4.1.7 Live sailing, summary of observations 
The aim of this transit was to train the navigators in different control modes and level of 
difficulty. Their focus was to train control of the navigation by either visual, radar or 
combined radar and visual as described in their manual for the bridge  (MTBTS, 2009). 
In addition, the training element to advance with the highest speed possible is very often 
included. In general, the navigation was carried out in a very safe and controlled way. 
When the control mode was “combined radar and visual control,” the main focus was 
on visual evaluation of contacts detected on radar and/or AIS. None of the AIS targets 
were manually or automatically activated. There was no attempt to use AIS data to 
achieve more information, which would predict contact movements. All decisions to 
avoid collision were made after visual detection. The method of utilising speed and the 
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ability to accelerate and de-accelerate very fast is generally very effective although no 
experience with other electronic aids is gained by the use of this method. Compared 
with the visual information, radar and AIS had definitely lower priority as information 
sources. 
High speed combined with narrow waters was a demanding task for the two navigators 
and they were thus forced to constantly prioritise their work. Operating the functions via 
the menu system was time demanding, and when the functions on radar or ECDIS were 
needed, the operator had to focus solely on that task. When a navigator had to do such a 
task, he informed the other by stating “looking down.” Still, the operator looking down 
rarely used the time to search for AIS contacts.  
There is no stated procedure to make sure that the settings of the radar are optimal. 
Instead the operators were adjusting the radar on a “need to do” basis. Trails were off all 
the time, relative vectors were not used, and the criteria for the collision alarm were 
never changed, although the alarm was detected and acted upon. 
Part 4 and 5 included both navigation in 42 knots in daylight and 20 knots in the dark. 
In both cases the navigators focused mostly on visual contacts evaluation, but also 
showed that they used the radar to find radar tracks. However, even in the dark the 
targets were seldom activated, and data was rarely read before they made a decision to 
maneuver. 
Tracking and AIS data might have been helpful in part 5 especially due to the darkness 
when own speed was reduced to 20 knots i.e. when operators had more time to do more 
thorough examinations due to lower speed. 
Relevant elements can be summarised as follows: 
 The radar was not tested before it needed to be used 
 Radar was only adjusted when needed 
 High speed demands rapid decisions which sometimes exclude the possibility to 
utilize all the possible electronic anti collision aids  
 Most decisions are made based on optical observations alone 
 AIS targets are generally not activated and data are not read 
 Trails are randomly used 
 Automatic acquisition and “fusion of targets” are never used. These would 
probably not be suitable in inshore high speed navigation but have never been 
tested 
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 The two navigators often reached a state of high workload, sometimes caused by 
work carried out in other areas than navigation 
 
4.2 Findings from simulator observations  
4.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the simulator tests was basically the same as for the live navigation: to 
observe the use of radar and AIS for anti-collision in an IBS environment, and to 
observe the ability to utilise the radar and AIS for detection and evaluation of targets, in 
other words, to take proper action. The observations supported the thesis objective 1 
directly and objective 2 indirectly. As in the live observation the candidate did not know 
the purpose of the observation; they were supposed to navigate as normal. 
The obvious advantage with the simulator is that it was possible to create many relevant 
potential collision situations to achieve a larger number of observations than in live 
navigation. All the teams were exposed to the same scenario which presented a 
possibility to make comparisons.  
4.2.2 Scenario # 1: Inshore but open waters 
Scenario #1 took place in a main shipping route north of Bergen with a lot of traffic 
including oil tankers entering to and from an oil refinery. The waters are quite open with 
a fairly low level of navigational difficulty which assured a main focus on the 3 targets 
T1, T2 and T3. These targets were all planned to be on collision course (see Figure 4-5). 
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Figure 4-5: Overview of scenario # 1 setup in simulator 
Target no.1 (T1) was a tanker with a fully functional AIS and had the right of way. 
Target no.2 (T2) was a ferry with a fully functional AIS approached from port without 
the right of way. 
Target no.3 (T3) was a smaller fast-ferry heading opposite courses. The echo was 
“coming and going,” technically done by adjusting by the targets radar cross section 
(RCS) value. T3 had no AIS and the target was changing courses regularly. 
Various other contacts (AA, BB, CC, and DD) all had fully functional AISs, but did not 
present any collision danger. 
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The weather was poor with darkness and heavy sea state of 2-3 metres. The visibility of 
ship navigational light was 2 nm. 
 
Figure 4-6: Frigate simulator, scenario at night 
4.2.3 Team 1, Scenario # 1. 
The navigation team consisted of two fully trained and certified navigators together 
with one helmsman, one lookout and one assigned radar operator. This configuration of 
the navigational team is one or two persons more than usually would be used in this 
situation. Own ship was a Fridtjof Nansen Class frigate doing 22 knots.  
The mode of navigation was “combined visual and radar.” Throughout the test, the 
navigators focused on the ECDIS as their main source of information. The collision 
alarm initiated the interest for AIS target T1 and T2 that were discovered on the ECDIS. 
The target evaluation was done on the ECDIS but the information of the targets on AIS 
was never read. None of the AIS targets were activated by the operators and the radar 
was mainly used for PI to ensure safe positioning. Since the AIS data was not read, the 
navigators were not able to identify T1 and T2 until they were spotted visually. In spite 
of 5 persons in the navigation team, not all available information was explored to 
achieve a better SA. If the team had read the information, they would have known that it 
was a tanker that most likely would turn north towards the refinery after entering the 
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fjord. After the tanker was spotted visually, all the decisions were made on the basis of 
optical bearings.  
 
 
Figure 4-7: T1 Passing the bow of own ship 
The solution to clear T1 (see Figure 4-7) was to turn starboard but only turn 5 degrees 
which was not enough to make a clear statement to T1 as demanded in COLREG. Rule 
7 c describes how assumptions will not be made on the basis of scanty information. The 
navigators should be especially aware of the danger of making small course alterations 
when the target close (Cockcroft and Lameijer, 2011). In this case the decisions were 
made on scanty information even if more correct information could easily be obtained. 
No one attempted to alter scale or optimise the picture on the radar. Relative vectors or 
EBL were not used, but the OBD was used to some extent. 
T3 was discovered by the radar operator 15 minutes later, about 3 nm ahead and proved 
hard to track as planned. As for T1 and T2, the decisions to avoid T3 were made after 
visual observation even if this was a smaller ship and harder to see. 
The team was not very much concerned with the contacts AA, BB, CC and DD, which 
did not as such contribute to any relevant findings. 
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4.2.4 Team 2, scenario # 1. 
The navigation team consisted of two fully trained and certified navigators together 
with one helmsman, and one lookout. Own ship was a Fridtjof Nansen Class frigate 
doing 22 knots and the mode of navigation was “combined visual and radar.” 
T1 and T2 were discovered on AIS 4 minutes earlier than Team 1. The radar operator 
worked well to achieve an optimal radar picture but T2 was never tracked, never 
constituting a threat. Hence focus was on T1 which also was tracked on radar as soon as 
it was possible. T1 was also activated on AIS, but data was not read. Relative vectors 
were utilised, but the OOW decided to contact T1 by VHF to agree on the passing. The 
radar operator used the radar well and discovered T3 4 minutes after the echo was 
visible the first time on radar. AA and BB were also discovered on AIS but the data was 
not read as the contacts were assessed not to be a potential danger. 
The settings for collision alarm were default, not known by the operators and never 
adjusted.   
4.2.5 Team 3, scenario # 1. 
The navigation team consisted of two fully trained and certified navigators operating the 
IBS on the Skjold class simulator (Appendix B). The initial speed was 42 knots and 
there was no attempt to optimise the radar picture or to adjust trails or alarm settings. 
Nevertheless, the picture was fairly good but the scale was not changed to look further 
ahead. The AIS symbol of T1 and T2 were discovered after 7 minutes at a range of 6-7 
nm. 10 minutes later T3 was detected on radar at 6 nm. Because of the high speed, own 
ship passed in front of both T1 and T2 which never represented any danger. However, 
the main focus for the radar was safe positioning of own ship. Relative vectors were not 
used, but optical including OBD were used to detect relative motion of the targets. AA 
and BB were both detected by AIS but never considered by the team. 
4.2.6 Team 4, scenario # 1. 
Team 4 consisted of a navigation team of two fully educated navigators from the final 
year of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. They had only live experience from the 
Naval Academy training vessels, the Kvarven and Nordnes (Appendix B). They had, 
however, not yet commenced the training on board an operational naval ship. 
They used a generic corvette model of 50m length. Speed was 22 knots.  
T1 and T2 were discovered by AIS and T1 was tracked by radar as soon as target 
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became visible on the radar (see Figure 4-8). 
.  
Figure 4-8: Section of the bridge showing T1 and T2 on the radar. 
The radar operator adjusted the radar picture but did not access the alarm settings. T1 
and T2 were discovered by AIS, and as soon as they became visible, they were tracked 
and relative vectors were utilised. Trails were on.  
The radar was mainly used for positioning, but was also used to search for contacts and 
evaluate the collision risk. There was much focus on how to handle T1 and T2. T2 was 
avoided by turning starboard and after looking into the data of the AIS, they called T1 
to agree on passing each other. 
 
Figure 4-9: 3 sequences of the radar showing T3 proving hard to track. 
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Along with the other teams, team 4 found it problematic to track T3 due to the planned 
alteration of radar cross section, RCS (simulating a small target in rough sea). In 
addition, T3 did not have AIS, they lost track several times and T3 wandered off (see 
Figure 4-9, part 3). This caused a lot of attention which stressed the navigation team. It 
made them alter course several times and abandon their initial route. However, they 
worked hard to keep SA and mainly after assessment by visual observations, they 
managed to achieve a safe passage of the contact.  
4.2.7 Summary scenario # 1. 
 No teams performed the initial control and adjustment of the radar 
 Collision alarm and AIS on radar and ECDIS made the teams aware of the contacts 
 There was no deliberate attempt to adjust alarm settings and only one team 
considered used trails 
 Except for team 4, there was no attempt to use relative vectors or electronic bearing 
lines (EBL)  
 Radar was mainly utilized for positioning and the main control method was PI 
 All teams focused on visual observations and some used the OBD 
 No targets were manually activated, they were only activated via collision alarm 
 Teams with long experience used electronic aid less than teams with shorter 
experience. 
 
4.2.8 Scenario # 2: Narrow waters, many contacts with and without AIS.  
The simulated scenario took place in a familiar main traffic route outside the naval base. 
The weather was typical autumn with rain and 1 metre wave height. The visibility was 
only 2-400m and it was dark. 
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Figure 4-10: Overview of the initial setting of scenario # 2 
As illustrated in Figure 4-10, the main focus of this trial was the 7 small (40-50 feet 
cabin cruiser type) boats. All the contacts were moving from an area with small islands 
where they were hard to separate from the islands and rocks on the radar. Two were 
equipped with AIS, but five were not. All would be on collision course sooner or later. 
Two other AIS vessels, AA and BB were transiting in the main fairway with AIS, easy 
to spot, without being any major threat. 
In addition to the observation elements in scenario # 1, scenario # 2 also investigated if 
the navigators were able to spot moving targets between the small islands and rocks and 
if they were “blinded” by the fact that there were several AIS contacts in the same area 
(all expected to have AIS). For this reason the scenario included more contacts than 
there would normally be in this area. 
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4.2.9 Team 3, scenario # 2 
Navigation team 3 consisted of two fully trained and certified navigators operating the 
IBS on the Skjold class simulator. The initial speed was 42 knots but they soon reduced 
speed based on poor visibility, traffic and contacts ahead, but before any of the non-AIS 
contacts were detected.  
AA and BB were both detected early on AIS and tracked later. At the start of the 
scenario, the overtaking of AA took all focus for some minutes, giving little time to 
search for other contacts. Simultaneously a lot of attention was given to positioning of 
the ship which led to a degree of overload.  
Contact no 1 came as a surprise and were only avoided by turning port and making a 
full stop. Contact nr 3 (see Figure 4-10) was tracked and was AIS equipped, taking most 
of the focus as it was on collision course and hard to track. At this time, none of the 
other contacts were detected, and although the team worked to adjust the picture, they 
never turned on trail which could have made it easier for the detection of the non-AIS 
targets. Also, the team never had time or found it relevant to read any of the AIS data. 
Several of the contacts without AIS were not detected (see Figure 4-11)  
Even if the visibility was very limited, the team partly based their decisions on visual 
observations of targets in order to decide on manoeuvres to avoid collision. The 
scenario was challenging and it put the team close to a state of overload that forced 
them to reduce speed of advance to be able to achieve safe navigation.  
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Figure 4-11: Radar picture from team 3 showing different targets and their status 
4.2.10 Team 4, scenario # 2 
Team 4 consisted of two fully educated navigators from the final year of the Naval 
Academy (see paragraph 4.2.6). The same corvette model as in scenario #1 was used, 
but the initial speed was reduced due to the environmental conditions.  
Team 4 discovered AA and BB early on AIS. The overtaking of AA was done with 
distinct course change as demanded by the COLREG. They managed to follow the 
planned route without too much diversion but by changing the speed instead. (see 
Figure 4-12) 
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Figure 4-12: Radar picture from team 4 showing contacts with and without AIS 
Positioning and decision making related to AIS contacts that resulted in a late discovery 
of the non-AIS track had main focus, but nearly all were detected as they had turned on 
trails. The team also tracked AIS contacts but never gave priority to reading data. 
Relative vectors were used but not EBL and OBD.  
4.2.11 Summary of scenario # 2. 
Many of the same findings as in scenario #1 were experienced. Again team 4 was the 
only group using trails, working to improve the radar picture. This scenario had worse 
optical conditions than in scenario # 1, but the navigators would still to a large extent 
prioritise information obtained by optical means as basis for their decisions.  
Taking into consideration that the scenario introduced a somewhat unrealistic amount of 
contacts, it showed that contacts without AIS are more difficult to discover in areas with 
many contacts in a littoral area with several other land echoes. In this scenario VHF 
communication would perhaps be an appropriate measure of informing the ships AA 
and BB, and to warn off several smaller contacts, but the VHF was never used.  
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4.3 Description and questionnaire analysis 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to do research on navigators’ knowledge on anti 
collision aids. To ensure similar conditions and comparable answers, the questions and 
answers were presented and noted by the author of this paper. All 19 navigators were 
interviewed during two days. 
17 officers served on operational ships while 2 were last year students from the Naval 
Academy. The average experience as navigators was 2,5 years (2, 8 years not including 
the students). 15 officers were serving on the Skjold class coastal corvettes (FPBs), and 
4 were serving on the frigate, Fridtjof Nansen class (FF). 10 had already passed training 
for independent officer of the watch (OOW), while 9 were on different levels in their 
training to become an OOW. 
The first question was designed to look into how the candidates would prioritise the 
sensors. The 19 next questions were divided in two levels of difficulty. First level was 
user related and the next was designed to examine a deeper understanding of the system. 
4.3.2 Prioritising of sensors 
The first question described a realistic scenario, transiting in daylight and in the dark, 
inshore in the main traffic routes of the Norwegian littoral area (Appendix C), where 
different sensors failed, but only one at the time. The officer was to decide if the failure 
of one sensor was critical (have to stop), partly critical (continue but delayed) or not 
critical (no implications) to achieve the mission. The most valuable part for this thesis 
was the evaluation of radar, AIS, ECDIS and log, but it was necessary to include all the 
sensors to cover the main focus and to be able to compare the answers. However, in one 
way or another all the sensors might be relevant directly or indirectly as aids in anti-
collision.   
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Diagram 4-1: Evaluating the importance of sensors after failure 
 
Diagram 4-1 presents the results of how the navigators prioritised each sensor under the 
circumstance that one would fail but all the others continued to work. The answers show 
how each officer would value each sensor in the given scenario. 17 of 19 officers stated 
that the ship would have to stop without ECDIS and no other map would be available; a 
sensible and logic answer that was not hard to predict. The other sensors that were 
relatively easy to decide upon for the candidates were the OBD, INS and log; the 
majority agreed that the failure in these sensors would not affect the mission. Most of 
the candidates expressed that they would very well manage without AIS and log, yet 
doubt existed whether the log was important or not. Settling on radar or GPS proved 
most difficult, and it was interesting to notice that more than 50% decided that they 
would achieve the mission but with delay even if the radar failed. On the other hand, no 
one valued GPS to be critical. 
4.3.3 Discussion first question  
Analysing the response to the ECDIS failure question alone is not enough to make a 
significant trend, but viewing ECDIS, radar  and GPS together, there is an indication 
that although radar and GPS are important, they are not critical. This finding coincides 
with the findings of O.S. Hareide’s MSc (2013) which describes how navy navigators 
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are trained to navigate without trusting the GPS.  It looks as if the ECDIS may present 
the navigators with all they can handle, thus automatically turning into the primary aid 
in the IBS. This thesis (ibid.) describes that civilian navigators are much more 
dependant on GPS than their military counterparts. These findings confirm the fact that 
to navigate a warship the navigators are being taught not to depend 100% on GPS, and 
are thus regularly trained to navigate without GPS and AIS input. However, the given 
scenario was a transit in peacetime, in the dark, and it was important to arrive safely i.e. 
the only explanation why the majority would manage without radar would be the trust 
in the ECDIS and the ability to evaluate the used sensors accuracy underway by other 
means than radar. 
The insecurity in the answers concerning log, INS and heading gyro could partly be a 
result of shallow knowledge of the complex integration of the sensors which coincides 
with the experience expressed by NNC (NNC, 2009) which mentions the complexity in 
the new IBS. 
4.3.4 Analysis of knowledge within radar and AIS 
The questions were aimed at measuring the level of understanding within an area that is 
relevant for optimal use of both radar and AIS in anti collision. The detailed score in 
each question and each candidate are listed in Appendix D. Questions 1 to 12 represent 
subjects often addressed by the navigators during their normal work day. They are more 
likely to have knowledge of these than the last section of questions. Questions 13-19, on 
the other hand, are further remote from daily operations, but are still relevant for 
optimal utilisation of the navigational aids.  
As expected, the scores were higher in the first part shown in Diagram 4-2.  
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Diagram 4-2: Level 1. User related questions 
The overall average score on Q1-12 was 71%, an acceptable total level. However, based 
on these questions level of difficulty, the scores on some of the questions could be 
regarded as too low for navigators at this career level.  
Question 1 (Q1) asks about the mode NUP/FT, which is the most frequently used radar 
mode. Very few had complete knowledge of how it worked, indicated by an average 
score of 61%, yet most had a score around 50%.  
The basic knowledge to support the decision to choose 9 or 3 GHz radar is generally too 
low with only 53% score (Q3). However, the Skjold class has only the 9 GHz radar for 
navigation, not giving the navigators a chance to practise the use of two different 
navigation radars. 
Q4 addresses adjustments of the radar to optimize the radar picture. These adjustments 
are executed regularly, which is probably the reason for the high score. However, Q16 
(Diagram 4-3) which is a more complicated question within the same area, shows that 
there is lack of technical understanding.  
Q6 is simply asking about the criteria for collision alarm which is very vital in anti 
collision and experienced on a daily basis. The average score is good (76%) but too few 
knew that the target had to violate the TCPA as well as the CPA.  
Fusion of targets (Q8) has not been explored or used by any of the navigators and thus 
achieves a score as low as 29%. Q11 also stands out in a negative way with a mere 16% 
score. Only 3 persons knew that the name of the ship is transmitted every 6 minutes in 
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the AIS system. This result is surprising as everyone stated that they had seen many 
times that the name appeared after a while. Some expressed that they had never thought 
about it, and some believed that it had to do with the target range. Again the data shows 
that there are basic gaps in knowledge and perhaps more worrying, no urge to find out 
“why.” Ultimately, the wrong answers might be transferred from the experienced to the 
young officers. Nevertheless, the results of the rest of the questions were quite 
satisfactory, perhaps better than what could be expected. 
Level 2 questions. Deeper technical level
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Diagram 4-3: Level 2. Deeper, technical level questions 
The more technical level questions returned a score of a total average of 41% with the 
lowest 10% and the highest 65% (see Diagram 4-3). Q19 has the lowest score which 
may be explained because it does not very often happen that the ship name is jumping 
from one target to another in spite of the fact that there has been a problem when larger 
naval ships give the same MMSI nr to the mother ship and their rigid-hull inflatable 
boat (RHIB). 
For 6 out of 7 questions the overall scores were more uniform than the “user level” 
questions. In addition, the navigators knew almost the same part of the answer which 
indicates that this technical level is mainly forgotten after the officers start their 
operational duty. When the answer was explained, most of navigators responded that 
they had not thought about this since school. However, in most cases, it should be 
possible to operate the AIS and radar on a daily basis without having a deep 
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understanding, and perhaps it is too much to demand that every navigator should be at 
this level. On the other hand, it might be compulsory that the knowledge is present and 
available on each ship, e.g. one dedicated expert on each ship. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that the navigators would benefit from understanding the systems better.  
Naval ships have used AIS for several years and all navigators have the mandatory AIS 
course, having experienced it at a practical level. AIS is a recent technology compared 
to the radar but most of the navigators involved in this thesis have experienced AIS and 
radar from the start of their careers. Q14 addressed the strengths and weaknesses of the 
AIS and the radar, but none of the candidates had ever considered comparing the two 
systems in this respect and thus delivering a low score. 
Automatic acquisition was addressed in Q15 and the response was much the same; “we 
never use it, so I don’t know.” The question gives away some of the answer, but no one 
knew that it also inflicted AIS. Question 7 (Diagram 4-2) also asked about automatic 
acquisition at easier levels, returning nearly 80% which indicates that the easier bits 
were known but the more technical understanding was only mastered at a superficial 
level.  
4.3.5 Questionnaire summary  
It is reassuring to learn that the navigators are trained to continue navigating even if 
sensors like GPS would fail (Hareide, 2013). Nevertheless, there seems to be a great 
dependency on the ECDIS and perhaps a slightly less reliance on radar. Considering the 
fact that there might be situations where the use of radar on military ships must be kept 
to a minimum, this is in accordance with navy policy. Still, this should not be a reason 
for not having able knowledge of all the sensors available, including the radar. 
It is reasonable to assert that there is a great deal of radar and AIS knowledge within 
anti-collision area of interests. However, it seems like there exist significant gaps in the 
navigators’ knowledge both on the “user level” and the advanced technical level.  
The navigators complain about too complex systems and too much to learn in a short 
time. This finding is also underlined by the Navy Navigation centre in their presentation 
and paper, discussing complex systems and knowledge gap (NNC, 2009). The 
navigators participating in this research all showed an extraordinary dedication and 
interest, being very keen to understand the questions being raised. However, several 
officers expressed that there is not enough time to maintain and increase knowledge on 
a daily basis.  
The officers are from the beginning trained to navigate even if systems fail and they 
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therefore, especially in the start, focus on visual and manual modes. The answers 
indicate that experienced operators are likely to have more confidence in radar, giving 
the radar higher priority and value in the IBS.  
Concerning the automatic functions such as e.g. “fusion of targets” and “automatic 
acquisition,” there is a correlation between the knowledge and user frequency. It also 
seems like the navigators often knew “half” of the answers and when confronted with 
this, they did not feel comfortable about it. They mainly explained this as a result of 
shortage of time and that nobody asked them to produce a profound insight into these 
topics.  
All the navigators had completed the formal education at the highest level (STCW 95) 
at the Naval Academy, conducting or completing a training program at the operational 
units. It is of course never possible that every curricular item will be remembered, but 
this thesis suggests that most of the advanced technical understanding is hard to 
maintain during operational duty. Nevertheless, it also showed that good knowledge 
was present within several important user level domains. 
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5 Conclusion and recommendations 
 
Due to the long and challenging coastline of Norway, navigation skills have proved to 
be a crucial factor for the Norwegian navy. Based on long traditions, all naval units 
spend much time and effort to navigate faster, safer and tactically better. For decades 
radar has been the most important electronic tool to ensure navigation at an acceptable 
risk level. 
After the introduction of computer based, paperless bridge systems, a new level of 
benefits and challenges was introduced. It was now possible to give the navigators a 
new set of tools, and it was technologically possible to do things faster and with a 
higher level of automation and precision. When the first electronic charts were 
introduced on board the operational ships, not much training was assessed to be 
necessary. However, after some years of experience, the NNC found that the transition 
had not been as expected (NNC, 2009). With the new system followed a demand for 
more education and training. Other factors experienced were the complexity of the IBS, 
the possible information overload and user “unfriendliness.” The accident statistics 
underlined the new challenges; the number of collisions was reduced until 2007, but 
then started to increase again (NMD, 2010). In 2000 there were only 4 more collisions 
than in 2010 (Figure 2-5). For comparison, the numbers of groundings decreased in the 
period 2000 to 2004, but from then on showed a significant increase until it stabilised in 
2007.  
The COLREG came into force in 1977, serving as a good platform to avoid collision.  
In their book, however, Cockcroft and Lameijer describe the necessity for a clear 
understanding (2011) . AIS is not described in the COLREG but is clearly an aid and 
must therefore be interpreted as being included in the wording “by all available means” 
in rule 5 (Norris, 2008, Patraiko, 2013).  
As Dr. Norris (2008) points out, the radar has been developed over 60 years and has for 
decades been the single most important anti collision electronic tool. The introduction 
of IBS and especially the introduction of ECDIS have been described as a revolution, 
having forced the shipping industry to rethink how education, training and safe 
navigation are done. The RNoN experienced this as well, and in 2013 the NNC issued 
the military publication SNP 500 containing recommendations and regulation to achieve 
safe and effective navigation (NNC, 2012). An important anti-collision tool is the AIS 
that to some extent presents the navigator with an alternative to the radar, but with a 
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total different technology. The digital communication between ships makes it possible 
to exchange much needed information that was hard to get hold of earlier. Nevertheless, 
only a small part of the information is relevant in an anti-collision perspective. The 
radar being an old invention does not mean that it is outdated. On the contrary, the radar 
has been constantly developing into new types with new technology to perform better in 
general and especially under difficult conditions. However, with the introduction of 
computer technology, the radar has given the navigators more possibilities then ever 
before. There are more automatic functions like automatic acquisition and definitions of 
acquisition area. The menu system on a modern radar looks like a PC with complex 
menu systems that is not always fully understood by all the users. 
From the literature review there was an apparent trend that insufficient utilisation of 
radar, AIS, and the lack or incorrect use of look-out were important factors in many 
accidents. The research of collision reports from Norway (NMD, 2010), UK (MAIB, 
2004) and Australia (MCA, 2007) have revealed that there is still a challenge regarding 
the utilisation of electronic radar and AIS to avoid collision. The “Bridge watch keeping 
safety study” from MAIB concluded that 73% had improper or poor use of radar. These 
findings are from 2004 but are unfortunately verified from time to time, e.g. the 
collision between Far Swan and the barge Miclyn 131 in 2010 stated badly tuned radar, 
inappropriately set up AIS and bad look-out as some important factors contributing to 
the collision. Several reports also mentioned in detail the lack of understanding of the 
technology and the failure of using simple aids as trails, relative bearings, optical 
bearing, EBL and similar.  
If the modern IBS might place the navigators in an overload situation, it could be seen 
to actually counter effect the creation of better situation awareness, in worse case 
making better decisions difficult. 
All the ships in the RNoN are being equipped with IBSs, complying to as many as 
possible of IMO’s performance standards, as recommended in the current radar 
performance standard (IMO, 2004).  
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With the technical development, and the transition to modern IBS in mind, this thesis 
aimed to look at how the RNoN has performed after the transition to IBS. The 
objectives of the thesis were to: 
1. Identify and examine the use of AIS and radar in anti-collision by live 
observations and simulated tests 
2. Explore the knowledge of radar and AIS use relevant for anti-collision 
3. Formulate recommendations on the education and training within radar and AIS 
To support these three objectives, the fieldwork consists of three parts: live 
observations, observations in the simulator and interviews.  
The live sailing was 600nm transit inshore Norway coastline both in light and dark 
conditions and at varying weather conditions on board a Skjold class FPB. In the 
simulator two different areas and scenarios were designed to achieve as many relevant 
actions as possible. Within the limitations of the questions, the questionnaire measured 
the knowledge of the operators regarding the understanding and use of radar and AIS on 
two levels of technical difficulty. 
The findings in this thesis have definitely showed that the challenges are also relevant 
for the naval navigators observed during the field tests.  
During the trials there were never fewer than two qualified navigators executing the 
navigation, and several times the teams were complemented with helmsman, look-out, 
or extra operators. In spite of this, there were several occasions where the teams did not 
have time to operate and utilise all available anti-collision aids. The reasons for this are 
most likely down to several different factors which lead back to the objectives of this 
thesis. The RNoN navigators have a comprehensive and structured education and 
training which probably are more comprehensive than civilian navigators. Nevertheless, 
the findings indicate that the operators might not fully utilise the radar and AIS the way 
it was intended. Conversely, they also showed that they are able to handle advanced, 
potential collision situations by making highly qualified decisions in high speed and in 
challenging environments. Another clear trend is that all navigators had been trained 
very well to use visual observations by evaluating situations looking out the window or 
using the OBD (Figure 2-1), common on all naval ships. In fact, visual observations 
were always a vital factor when the OOW made anti-collision decisions even if other 
useful information was available. On the other hand, the electronic aids, activating the 
AIS target, tracking targets, choosing trails, using relative vectors, or EBL were rarely 
investigated before decisions were made.  
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The MAIB reports (2004) mention the lack of look-outs in several incidents. During the 
observations a look-out was always in place and well trained in accordance with STCW 
95. Only on the Skjold class the look-out function was carried out by one of the two 
navigators when the situation allowed it. Under certain circumstances listed in the 
STCW 95 regulation II/1 section 4, this can be justified (IMO, 1978). The look-out duty 
is divided by the two navigators and normally works well. However, the extra task adds 
an extra duty to the team, and in times of high workload it may lead to reduction in the 
quality of the look-out duty. 
Except from automatic radar tuning that was always activated (default) and the 
occasional use of automatic clutter control, no “automatic” functions like the “automatic 
acquisition”, or the “fusion of targets” were deliberately activated. AIS targets were 
seldom activated and except when finding the name of the ship, the data from these 
contacts were not often read. The AIS tracks were automatically activated when the 
criteria for the collision alarm were met. Unfortunately, no one ever adjusted these 
criteria and the knowledge in this subject proved to be average which could be expected 
when nearly never operated. 
The findings during live navigation support the analysis of the first question where 
ECDIS tended to have higher priority than the radar. Due to the integration of AIS with 
the radar, ECDIS was the primary source of information. In periods with restricted 
visibility due to rain and/or darkness the radar received more attention, but the ECDIS 
was still the main source of information in the IBS. Operating the ECDIS was often 
prioritised over the radar. Hence the operators used a relatively small amount of time to 
make sure that the radar was optimised for the fast changing situations.  
When rapidly assessing whether a contact is on collision course, an easy technique is to 
observe the change in relative bearing of a contact. There were both optical and 
electronic tools available, but in some cases the navigators made measurements based 
on just looking at the contact which works well if there is a high rate of change in the 
contact bearing. However, this method was also used when the rate was only slowly 
altered. In some cases in the simulator, the OBD was used. The electronic radar aid, 
“relative vectors” was seldom utilised.  
Echo trails can make it easier to distinguish the targets from small islands and “aids to 
navigations” (ATON), but few used it deliberately to increase the SA. The importance 
of this relatively simple tool is described in the collision between MV Spring Bok and 
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MV Gas Arctic where “relative vectors” were an important factor contributing to the 
accident (MAIB, 2012).  
In addition to the question of how navigators prioritised the different navigational 
sensors, the other questions were divided in a technical part focusing on system 
knowledge and a more user related part. The overall findings from the questionnaire 
were that the knowledge in user related questions was considerably better than the more 
technical ones. The operators had no knowledge of the functions that they never used 
during the live sailing and simulator tests. However, there was some good knowledge in 
the user related questions but also some inadequate, e.g. very few had a complete 
knowledge of how their most used radar mode worked. Still, the knowledge in how to 
optimise the radar picture was good. Nevertheless, when they were asked to explain rain 
and sea clutter technically, they had not thought about this since school.  
These findings may indicate that there is not much time or initiative to research and find 
out how the IBS works on a daily basis. There was definitely no lack of interest when 
the subjects were raised and most of the candidates expressed a curiosity and 
willingness to learn more during the interviews. 
It is a fact that the modern naval ship is more technologically advanced than ever 
before, and it is a question whether the operators are given enough time and effort to 
learn and understand the system at a level that would make them utilise all anti-
collisions aids to a satisfying degree. This thesis coincides with the article by the 
director of MNA who claims that modern navigation needs much more training than 
what the certificate calls for (Teisrud, 2007). However, the thesis shows that in order to 
master the new systems, dedication, and constant willingness to learn about the new 
topics, as well as relentless testing, experiencing the unknown are required. 
The extensive use of visual evaluation is good practise, proving that the navigators have 
not been deluded to rely only on what is presented on the screens. Nevertheless, it 
seems as the operators use the same methods on every occasion, not utilising and 
exploring other combinations of aids included in the IBS. 
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5.1 Synopsis of objectives  
Within the limitations of the thesis, the first objective has been complied with to a 
satisfactory level.  
 Both radar and AIS are being used as an anti-collision aid, but not all the electronic 
features are fully understood and used the way they are intended 
 The navigators are being taught from the beginning of their training that the truth is 
found by looking out the window. Generally, this is a very sound attitude, but the 
ideal procedure would be to combine all the different aids, including visual, to 
achieve a better SA 
 Most of the operators use the same method in every situation. Not one team utilised 
all the different features during the tests, e.g. relative vectors, EBL, OBD etc. 
 The complexity of the radar and AIS in the IBS is in some scenarios too much to 
handle for the navigators who instead simplify and reduce the inputs leading up to a 
decision 
The second object was to investigate the knowledge of the navigators. The thesis has 
provided an adequate overview of the level of knowledge. 
 The level of understanding in the user level questions was in general good with the 
exception of a few questions 
 The more technical part was not that familiar, indicating that the level of system 
understanding could be limited in some areas 
 The operators were capable of using the system on a daily basis, but limited 
knowledge in some areas might hamper a maximum exploitation of the IBS 
 Very few, perhaps none, of the candidates involved in this thesis had a near 
complete overview and understanding of the aids in anti collisions 
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The last objective aimed to formulate recommendations for the education. 
 It is reassuring that the theoretical education at the RNoNA is in accordance with 
STCW 95, qualifying the students to the highest certificate level. However, the 
thesis demonstrates that there is a need for familiarisation and training when on 
operational duty (on the job training). The thesis discloses that not all aids are fully 
understood, possibly leading to less situation awareness. 
The operational units are recommended to arrange for a system that maintains and 
increases the level of knowledge within this area  
 The systems are very complex and for an officer, there is a lot to learn. This implies 
that there has to be ample time and resources to carry out the necessary training for 
new officers, but also for the re-training of officers already being qualified as OOW. 
 It is recommended that an OOW ought to possess higher proficiency within the 
technical system level before they are qualified as OOWs. 
 The navigators should not be satisfied with utilising only one or two aids in anti-
collision. A change of routine that would state that all aids should be tested at least 
once during a watch, would perhaps have the wanted effect. 
 The final recommendation of future work is to research what level of knowledge 
and training will be sufficient for the different roles on board the different naval 
units. 
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7 Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Rules 5, 7 and 19 from the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea  
Rule 5 
Look-out 
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as 
by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as 
to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. 
Rule 7 
Risk of collision 
(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing 
circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any 
doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist. 
(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including 
long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or 
equivalent systematic observation of detected objects. 
(c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty 
radar information. 
(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following considerations shall be among 
those taken into account: 
(i) such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching 
vessel does not appreciably change; 
(ii) such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is 
evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when 
approaching a vessel at close range. 
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Rule 19 
Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility 
(a) This Rule applies to vessels not in sight of one another when navigating in or near an 
area of restricted visibility. 
(b) Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed adapted to the prevailing circumstances 
and conditions of restricted visibility. A power-driven vessel shall have her engines 
ready for immediate manoeuvre. 
(c) Every vessel shall have due regard to the prevailing circumstances and conditions of 
restricted visibility when complying with the Rules of Section I of this Part. 
(d) A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of another vessel shall determine 
if a close quarter’s situation is developing and/or risk of collision exists. If so, she shall 
take avoiding action in ample time, provided that when such action consists of an 
alteration of course, so far as possible the following shall be avoided: 
(i) an alteration of course to port for a vessel forward of the beam, other than for 
a vessel being overtaken; 
(ii) an alteration of course towards a vessel abeam or abaft the beam. 
(e) Except where it has been determined that a risk of collision does not exist, every 
vessel which hears apparently forward of her beam the fog signal of another vessel, or 
which cannot avoid a close-quarters situation with another vessel forward of her beam, 
shall reduce her speed to the minimum at which she can be kept on her course. She shall 
if necessary take all her way off and in any event navigate with extreme caution until 
danger of collision is over. 
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Appendix B: Live training vessels and simulator 
 
 
Figure 7-1:  Live navigation training vessels at the Naval Academy (courtesy NNC) 
 
Figure 7-2: Generic simulators (courtesy NNC) 
 
Figure 7-3: Type specific 1:1 simulator for Skjold Class (courtesy NNC) 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire  
Type of vessel (circle): Frigate, FPB, Mine, Others: 
Years as navigator: ......... Duty officer: yes no. 
File No. Sony: .............                                                 Mark= 0-100% 
nr Question RADAR/AIS 
CAT 1, User level  
”Model answers” Answer % 
0 You are in transit from 
Bergen - Florø. It is 
reported good visibility 
all the way, but it's dark 
20 nm prior to arrival. 
Prioritise the importance 
of the following aids to 
navigation on this trip, 
i.e. how it would affect 
the navigation if one aid 
is not working anymore. 
3 possible answers: Not 
Critical, NC (will be safe 
with no delay), Partly 
critical, PC (will arrive 
safe but with delay). 
Critical, C (must stop and 
moor as soon as 
possible). Log, GPS, 
Radar, ECDIS, , AIS, 
INS, Heading Gyro 
Log: NC (Not critical) 
GPS: NC  
Radar: C (Critical) 
ECDIS: C 
Optical bearing device, OBD: NC 
AIS: NC –PC (partly critical) 
INS: NC  
Heading Gyro PC 
S
ee
  
ap
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ix
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. 
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1 Explain the mode NUP / 
FT ? 
1. Land is moving.  
2. Is confined to a square on the 
screen.  
3. North up  
4. Own pos fixed 
5. True vector and trails. 
6. A mix of true and relative mode 
7. Radar is not adding trails on echoes 
that have opposite course and speed 
as own ship 
  
2 Pros and cons of mode 
NUP / FT? 
1. Depending on good input log and 
gyro.  
2. Easier to distinguish vessels from 
other echoes. 
3. No need to reset own pos 
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nr Question RADAR/AIS 
CAT 1, User level  
”Model answers” Answer % 
3 How is 9 Ghz radar 
distinguished from 3 
Ghz? 
1. Shorter wavelength and better 
resolution 
2. SART and Racon 
3. Smaller antenna 
4. 3 Ghz works better in rain and sea 
clutter 
  
4 Name minimum three 
features/controls of the 
radar that are important 
to optimize the radar 
picture 
1. Gain - video gain 
2. Rain- rain clutter control 
3. Sea - sea clutter control 
4. Puls length 
5. Tune - tune control  
  
5 When do you use "rain 
clutter control" and "sea 
clutter control"? 
1. Sea clutter control : Detect targets 
and objects through waves 
especially close to own ship 
2. See targets and objects through rain 
  
6 What are the conditions 
for the “COLL alarm” to 
go off? 
1. Coll: Collision alarm. One or more 
of the tracked targets are violating 
the CPA/TCPA limits. 
  
7 What is automatic 
acquisition 
1. A pre determined area where radar 
targets are automatically tracked 
and AIS targets are activated.  
  
8 What is “fusing of target” 1. One vector will be presented on 
basis of  1 ARPA and 1 AIS target 
2. Dependant of values set by operator 
 
  
9 What impact has antenna 
rotation speed on target 
detection? Advantages / 
Disadvantages 
1. Slow = number of pulses on the 
target 
2. Fast = faster update 
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nr Question RADAR/AIS 
CAT 1, User level  
”Model answers” Answer % 
10 Name at least 3 static and 
3 voyage data? 
1. MMSI 
2. Call sign 
3. Name 
4. IMO number 
5. Length and beam 
6. Type of ship 
7. Location of position fixing 
antennas on the ship 
8. (Height over keel) 
  
1. Ship’s draught 
2. Hazardous cargo type 
3. Type of ship 
4. Destination 
5. ETA 
(    (number of persons on board) 
11 MMSI number is visual 
on an AIS track, but not 
the name. Why do you 
think this is? 
1. Name is static data that is only 
transmitted  every 6 min.  
2. MMSI is with all the messages to 
identify the message 
  
12 When a target is tracked, 
does it show true and 
relative vectors? 
1. True if in true modes (including 
NUP/FT) 
2. Otherwise relative 
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Nr Question: RADAR / 
AIS CAT 2, 
Technical, system 
understanding 
”Model answers” Answer % 
 Why has a vessel two 
different nav radars 
(technically and with 
regards to 
performance)? 
Skjold class: Why is 
9GHz band radar 
selected as the only 
radar. 
3 Ghz (10cm) og 9 Ghz (3 cm). X-Band (3 
cm) S-Band (10 cm) 
Skjold: kortere bølgelengde bedre 
skilleevne, SART. Mindre antenne (3 Ghz 
er bedre på fog, rain, sea clutter) 
1. Better target acquisition wrt X-band 
best on short range and S-band best 
on longer rangers. 
2. Precipitation clutter: The effect is less 
marked at S-band (19 dB better than 
X-band for the same antenna 
beamwidths)  
3. WRT Multipath: The lobing effect at 
S-band is at a different spatial 
frequency coarser) and therefore a 
ship with both S-band and X-band 
radars is unlikely to have a target 
nulled at both frequencies. 
4. Different intereference thus the 
antennas is not place on the exact 
same place 
a. Target shielding different wrt 
blind arc. 
5. Ability to track more targets with two 
sets 
(M
er
g
ed
 w
it
h
 Q
 3
) 
 
13 Explain the tracking 
process? 
1. Target or not target, permanent or 
moving  
2. Target = yes. Calculate course and 
speed from point to point calculation, 
Rough large search area.  
3. Navigation filter: accurate track based 
on more data. Reduces the search area. 
Courses are lagging behind when target 
turns 
4. If the target is not found after a certain 
number of scan = lost track 
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Nr Question: RADAR / 
AIS CAT 2, 
Technical, system 
understanding 
”Model answers” Answer % 
14  “Radar AIS are 
complementary 
technologies that 
enhance the safety of 
navigation”. List the 
strengths and 
weaknesses of each 
technology to support 
this statement.  
 
Radar vs AIS:  
1. Rely on own system vs no control  
2. Ship relative and sea stabilised vs 
SOG-COG 
3. Difficult to jam vs easy to jam via GPS 
4. Clutter vs no clutter 
5. Line of sights vs behind obstacles   
6. Lagging behind when speed/heading 
changes vs rapid update. 
7. Only heading and speed vs lots of data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 How does automatic 
acquisition work? 
1. A zone is designed around own ship 
2. Targets entering zone will be 
automatically tracked 
3. AIS targets entering will be activated 
4. Can use barrier lines to avoid land 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Explain how rain- 
clutter control and 
sea-clutter control 
works, technically. 
1. Sea: logarithmic adjustment of gain. 
Reducing gain more close to vessel 
2. Rain: does not help with the reduction of 
gain. DIFF control cuts the echoes so that 
it is possible to see the target echo. Target 
echo or echo of land, etc., will in fact act in 
the same place every time we receive it, 
while reflection from rain will constantly 
change. Target echo will therefore be more 
powerful than the others. 
  
17 What are the tasks of 
the GPS receiver in 
the AIS? 
1. Synchronizing transmission 
2. Reserve position of the vessel 
  
18 Which sensors are 
connected to the 
radar? 
1. Log 
2. GPS 
3. GPS Heading,  
4. Gyro heading,  
5. AIS  
6. Echo sounder 
7. Other 
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Nr Question: RADAR / 
AIS CAT 2, 
Technical, system 
understanding 
”Model answers” Answer % 
19 An AIS track with 
same name jumps 
from one echo to 
another. What could 
be wrong? 
1. They have the same MMSI number 
(e.g.the  Sjøbjørn of a CG) 
  
 Have you ever used 
automatic 
acquisition?
 
YES / NO   
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Appendix D: Score calculations. 
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Appendix E: Observation form 
 
Form nr 1: Live sailing. Make note of the operation of radar, mostly adjustments and 
with regards to targets 
Time Area Day/ 
Night 
Level of 
difficulty 
Functions used on the 
radar and IBS 
Duration Remarks 
       
 
Form nr 2: Forms for live sailing: NOT performed activity. E.g. : Adjusting gain, sea, 
scale, pulse, no tracking of targets. Sea or ground stabilized input. Assessment of the 
course and speed. 
Time Area Day 
Night 
Level of 
difficulty 
Functions NOT 
used 
Why should it 
be used 
Remarks 
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Appendix F: Skjold class fast naval craft and Fridtjof Nansen class frigate. 
 
Figure 7-4: Skjold class, 45 metres – max 60 knots (source, www.forsvaret.no) 
 
Figure 7-5: Skjold class IBS (Kongsberg, 2005) 
 
Figure 7-6: Fridtjof Nansen class, 134m, max 26 knots (source, www.forsvaret.no) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7: IBS Fridtjof Nansen class (Kongsberg, 2005) 
